The two books reviewed here clarify how China addresses the problem of internal diversity. All states have to address this issue to some extent. Multiethnic empires like the Qing chose a strategy that recognized the separate political, legal, and social rights of communal groups (Mongols, Tibetans, Han Chinese, and the rest), as long as those groups accepted the overarching authority of the emperor.
others. Even places that imagined themselves as far more diverse, like the United States, expanded on the Westphalian principle that religious diversity was acceptable only if privatized and noncorporate.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the nation-state system became increasingly entrenched around the world as the only way to participate in diplomacy.
China also had to learn to reimagine itself as a nation-state. In the Mudanshe Incident of 1871, for example, which Emma Teng discusses in Taiwan's Imagined Geography, aboriginal people on Taiwan's southeastern coast apparently slaughtered most surviving sailors of a Japanese shipwreck. When Japan demanded compensation, the Chinese government replied that the wreck had occurred on ungoverned, savage territory and thus China had no responsibility. When Japan countered that it would claim this unclaimed territory, however, China was forced to redefine its boundary as a hard line around a closed space, instead of a gradual decline out to barbarism. 2 It had no choice but to be a nation-state.
Part of the issue here was that boundaries could no longer be fuzzy or ambiguous:
"savage territory" in Taiwan was no longer a political possibility. Mullaney's sources allowed him to reach several fresh and fascinating conclusions that come as a surprise to many of us. The first is that the entire project was by no means simply a recasting of Stalin's system of categories to fit the Chinese case. In fact, the Chinese first tried to let people classify themselves, without forcing any external scheme on them. They gave this up only when an early ethnic census based on selfidentification led to a list of 157 ethnonyms in Yunnan alone. Of those, ninety-two groups had fewer than one hundred people and twenty had only a single person each (p. Stalin's definition of natsia, after all, did not ultimately determine ethnic categories within the Soviet Union either. The USSR had also seen enormous debate over how to carry out ethnic classification, and in the end it developed a list much longer than China's:
128 groups in 1989, although the number changed significantly over time. Like China, though, the Soviet ethnographers did not limit themselves to natsia, but used the more flexible category of natsional'nost' (meaning a "nationally self-conscious community"). nation-state carries its own tensions. It exemplifies "the basic quandary faced by the Handominated regime-how to gain legitimacy by appearing to grant autonomy, while at the same time restricting that autonomy so that it does not pose a threat to the power of the Party/state" (pp. 28-29). It is not so easy, in other words, to combine the ethnic strategies of empires and nation-states. Since the reforms, the government has hoped that economic development along market lines would ease ethnic tensions in these areas, but Potter points out that, in practice, this secondary institutional purpose has carried its own tensions and limits. Here, of course, he echoes other critiques of the Western development campaign.
Potter often argues that the local embedding of institutions of autonomy, like the need to hire cadres from local ethnic groups, creates its own sets of difficulties. Of course, the need to hire local officials has created dilemmas for the state for most of China's history, and this is a dynamic that has spread far beyond the autonomous regions that Potter discusses. The real strength of his analysis is in making available an enormous amount of legal and regulatory material from China. Potter understands well that laws do not fully determine practices and, to his credit, he constantly points us toward the resulting contradictions. The book itself, however, provides little of the ethnographic or sociological detail we need to understand how those dynamics worked in practice.
The discussion of selective adaptation begins, rather remarkably for a book of this kind, by borrowing a theoretical frame from the postmodern literary critic Stanley Fish. Potter makes another interesting connection when he shows that policies on the "inner periphery" (Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia) run parallel to those on the "outer periphery" (Hong Kong and Taiwan). In all cases, the national laws of China still hold sway over any proposed form of autonomy, whether as an autonomous region or as a second system within a single country. That is, we remain in the realm of zizhi only.
The sole exception is the economy, where businesses from Taiwan appear to have the same kinds of privileges as those from outside the country-the right to be their own masters (zizhu). Politically, Potter sees the projects on the inner and outer peripheries as very close. He does point out, however, that the reality of cross-straits relations can create informal arrangements in daily interaction that go beyond the law (pp. 158-159), although he does not discuss in detail what these are.
Potter has collected an impressive amount of material, and the Chinese bibliography alone will be valuable to people working on the topic. I can think of no other source offering comparable information on the law in these areas. Potter is also aware of the dangers of formalism that sometimes mar discussions of Chinese law. As a result, he frequently points us toward informal arrangements, underlying tensions, and interpretive communities. In practice, however, the book remains primarily a discussion
